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Abstract
Relational properties describe multiple runs of one or more
programs. They characterize many useful notions of secu-
rity, program refinement, and equivalence for programs with
diverse computational effects, and they have received much
attention in the recent literature. Rather than developing
separate tools for special classes of effects and relational
properties, we advocate using a general purpose proof assis-
tant as a unifying framework for the relational verification of
effectful programs. The essence of our approach is to model
effectful computations using monads and to prove relational
properties on their monadic representations, making the
most of existing support for reasoning about pure programs.
We apply this method in F⋆ and evaluate it by encoding a
variety of relational program analyses, including information
flow control, semantic declassification, program equivalence
and refinement at higher order, correctness of program opti-
mizations and game-based cryptographic security. By rely-
ing on SMT-based automation, unary weakest preconditions,
user-defined effects, and monadic reification, we show that,
compared to unary properties, verifying relational properties
requires little additional effort from the F⋆ programmer.
Keywords Relational Verification, Monadic Effects, Proof
Assistants, Program Verification, SMT-based Automation,
Weakest Preconditions, Information-Flow Control, Program
Equivalence and Refinement, Certified Optimizations
1 Introduction
Generalizing unary properties (which describe single runs
of programs), relational properties describe multiple runs of
one or more programs. Relational properties are useful when
reasoning about program refinement, approximation, equiv-
alence, provenance, as well as many notions of security. A
great many relational program analyses have been proposed
in the recent literature, including works by Antonopoulos
et al. (2017); Asada et al. (2016); Banerjee et al. (2016); Barthe
et al. (2012, 2013b, 2014, 2015); Beckert et al. (2015, 2017);
Benton et al. (2009); Ştefan Ciobâcă et al. (2016); Godlin and
Strichman (2010); Hedin and Sabelfeld (2012); Kundu et al.
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(2009); Küsters et al. (2015); Yang (2007); Zaks and Pnueli
(2008); Murray et al. (2013); Fehrenbach and Cheney (2016);
Bauereiß et al. (2016, 2017); and Çiçek et al. (2017). While
some systems have been designed for the efficient verifica-
tion of specialized relational properties of programs (notably
information-flow type systems, e.g., Sabelfeld and Myers
(2003a)), others support larger classes of properties. These
include tools based on product program constructions for
automatically proving relations between first-order impera-
tive programs (e.g., SymDiff (Lahiri et al. 2012) and Descartes
(Sousa and Dillig 2016)), as well as relational program logics
(Benton 2004) that support interactive verification of rela-
tional properties within proof assistants (e.g., EasyCrypt
(Barthe et al. 2012) and RHTT (Nanevski et al. 2013)).
We provide a framework in which relational logics and
other special-purpose tools can be recast on top of a general
method for relational reasoning. The method is simple: we
use monads to model and program effectful computations;
and we reveal the pure monadic representation of an effect
in support of specification and proof. Hence, we reduce the
problem of relating effectful computations to relating their
pure representations, and then apply the tools available for
reasoning about pure programs. While this method should
be usable for a variety of proof assistants, we choose to work
in F⋆ (Swamy et al. 2016), a dependently typed programming
language and proof assistant. By relying on its support for
SMT-based automation, unary weakest preconditions, and
user-defined effects (Ahman et al. 2017), we demonstrate,
through a diverse set of examples, that our approach enables
the effective verification of relational properties with an
effort comparable to proofs of unary properties in F⋆ and to
proofs in relational logics with SMT-based automation.
Being based on an expressive semantic foundation, our
approach can be directly used to verify relational properties
of programs. Additionally, we can still benefit from more
specialized automated proof procedures, such as syntax-
directed relational type systems, by encoding them within
our framework. Hence, our approach facilitates compar-
ing and composing special-purpose relational analyses with
more general-purpose semi-interactive proofs; and it encour-
ages prototyping and experimenting with special-purpose
analyses with a path towards their certified implementations.
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2 Grimm et al.
1.1 Relational reasoning via monadic reification: A
first example
We sketch the main elements of our method on a proof of
equivalence for the two stateful, recursive functions below,
a task not easily accomplished using specialized relational
program logics:
let rec sum_up r lo hi =
if lo,hi then (r := !r+lo; sum_up r (lo+1) hi)
let rec sum_dn r lo hi =
if lo,hi then (r := !r+hi−1; sum_dn r lo (hi−1))
Both functions sum all numbers between lo and hi into some
accumulator reference r, the former function by counting up
and the latter function by counting down.
Unary reasoning about monadic computations As a
first step, we embed these computations within a depen-
dently typed language. There are many proposals for how
to do this—one straightforward approach is to encapsulate
effectful computations within a parameterized monad (Atkey
2009). In F⋆, as in the original Hoare Type Theory (Nanevski
et al. 2008), these monads are indexed by a computation’s
pre- and postconditions and proofs are conducted using a
unary program logic (i.e., not relational), adapted for use with
higher-order, dependently typed programs. Beyond state, F⋆
supports reasoning about unary properties of a wide class
of user-defined monadic effects, where the monad can be
chosen to best suit the intended style of unary proof.
Relating reified effectful terms Our goal is to conve-
niently state and prove properties that relate effectful terms,
e.g., prove sum_up and sum_dn equivalent. We do so by
revealing the monadic representation of these two computa-
tions as pure state-passing functions. However, since doing
this naïvely would preclude the efficient implementation of
primitive effects, such as state in terms of a primitive heap,
our general method relies on an explicit monadic reification
coercion for exposing the pure monadic representation of
an effectful computation in support of relational reasoning.1
Thus, in order to relate effectful terms, one simply reasons
about their pure reifications. Turning to our example, we
prove the following lemma, stating that running sum_up
and sum_dn in the same initial states produces equivalent
final states. (A proof is given in §2.4.)
r:ref int→ lo:int→ hi:int{hi ≥ lo}→ h:heap{r ∈ h}→
reify (sum_up r lo hi) h ∼ reify (sum_dn r lo hi) h
Flexible specification and proving style with SMT-
backed automation Although seemingly simple, proving
sum_up and sum_dn equivalent is cumbersome, if at all pos-
sible, in most prior relational program logics. Prior relational
logics rely on common syntactic structure and control flow
1While this coercion is inspired by Filinski’s 1994 reify operator, we only use
it to reveal the pure representation of an effectful computation in support
of specification and proof, whereas Filinski’s main use of reification was to
uniformly implement monads using continuations.
between multiple programs to facilitate the analysis. To rea-
son about transformations like loop reversal, rules exploiting
syntactic similarity are not very useful and instead a typical
proof in prior systems may involve several indirections, e.g.,
first proving the full functional correctness of each loop with
respect to a purely functional specification and then showing
that the two specifications are equivalent. Through monadic
reification, effectful terms are self-specifying, removing the
need to rewrite the same code in purely-functional style just
to enable specification and reasoning.
Further, whereas many prior systems are specialized to
proving binary relations, it can be convenient to structure
proofs using relations of a higher arity, a style naturally
supported by our method. For example, a key lemma in
the proof of the equivalence above is an inductive proof of
a ternary relation, which states that sum_up is related to
sum_up on a prefix combined with sum_dn on a suffix of
the interval [lo, hi).
Last but not least, using the combination of typechecking,
weakest precondition calculation, and SMT solving provided
by F⋆, many relational proofs go through with a degree of au-
tomation comparable to existing proofs of unary properties,
as highlighted by the examples in this paper.
1.2 Contributions and outline
We propose a methodology for relational verification (§2),
covering both broadly applicable ingredients such as repre-
senting effects using monads and exposing their representa-
tion using monadic reification, as well as our use of specific
F⋆ features that enable proof flexibility and automation. All
these ingredients are generic, i.e., none of them is specific to
the verification of relational properties.
The rest of the paper is structured as a series of case stud-
ies illustrating our methodology at work. Through these
examples we aim to show that our methodology enables
comparing and composing various styles of relational pro-
gram verification in the same system, thus taking a step
towards unifying many prior strands of research. Also these
examples cover a wide range of applications that, when taken
together, exceed the ability of all previous tools for relational
verification of which we are aware. Our examples are divided
into three sections that can be read in any order, each being
an independent case study:
Transformations of effectful programs (§3) We
develop an extensional, semantic characterization of a state-
ful program’s read and write effects, based on the relational
approach of Benton et al. (2006). Based on these semantic
read and write effects, we derive lemmas that we use to prove
the correctness of common program transformations, such
as swapping the order of two commands and eliminating re-
dundant writes. Going further, we encode Benton’s 2004 rela-
tional Hoare logic in our system, providing a syntax-directed
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proof system for relational properties as a special-purpose
complement to directly reasoning about a program’s effects.
Cryptographic security proofs (§4) We show how to
model basic game steps of code-based cryptographic proofs
of security (Bellare and Rogaway 2006) by proving equiv-
alences between probabilistic programs. We prove perfect
secrecy of one-time pad encryption , and a crucial lemma
in the proof of semantic security of ElGamal encryption, an
elementary use of Barthe et al.’s 2009 probabilistic relational
Hoare logic.
Information-flow control (§5) We encode several styles
of static information-flow control analyses , while account-
ing for declassification. Highlighting the ability to compose
various proof styles in a single framework, we combine au-
tomated, type-based security analysis with SMT-backed, se-
mantic proofs of noninterference.
Proofs of algorithmic optimizations (§6) With a few
exceptions, prior relational program logics apply to first-
order programs and provide incomplete proof rules that
exploit syntactic similarities between the related programs.
Not being bound by syntax, we prove relations of higher
arities (e.g., 4-ary and 6-ary relations) between higher-order,
effectful programs with differing control flow by reasoning
directly about their reifications. We present two larger ex-
amples: First, we show how to memoize a recursive function
using McBride’s 2015 partiality monad and we prove it equiv-
alent to the original non-memoized version. Second, we im-
plement an imperative union-find data structure, adding the
classic union-by-rank and path compression optimizations
in several steps and proving stepwise refinement.
From these case studies, we conclude that our method for
relational reasoning about reified monadic computations is
both effective and versatile. We are encouraged to continue
research in this direction, aiming to place proofs of rela-
tional properties of effectful programs on an equal footing
with proofs of pure programs in F⋆ as well as other proof
assistants and verification tools.
The code for the examples in this paper is available at
https://github.com/FStarLang/FStar/tree/master/examples/rel
Compared to this code, the listings in the paper are edited
for clarity and sometimes omit uninteresting details.
2 Methodology for relational verification
In this section we review in more detail the key F⋆ features
we use and how each of them contributes to our verification
method for relational properties. Two of these features are
general and broadly applicable: (§2.1) modeling effects us-
ing monads and keeping the effect representation abstract
to support efficient implementation of primitive effects and
(§2.3) using monadic reification to expose the effect represen-
tation. The remaining features are more specific to F⋆ and
enable proof flexibility and automation: (§2.2) using a unary
weakest precondition calculus to produce verification condi-
tions in an expressive dependently typed logic; (§2.4) using
dependent types together with pre- and postconditions to ex-
press arbitrary relational properties of reified computations;
(§2.4) embedding the dependently typed logic into SMT logic
to enable the SMT solver to reason by computation.
None of these generic ingredients is tailored to the verifi-
cation of relational properties, and while F⋆ is currently the
only verification system to provide all these ingredients in
a unified package, each of them also appears in other sys-
tems. This makes us hopeful that this relational verification
method can also be applied with other proof assistants (e.g.,
Coq, Lean, Agda, Idris, etc.), for which the automation would
likely come in quite different styles.
2.1 Modeling effects using monads
At the core of F⋆ is a language of dependently typed, total
functions. Function types are written x:t→ Tot t' where the
co-domain t' may depend on the argument x:t. Since it is
the default in F⋆, we often drop the Tot annotation (except
where needed for emphasis) and also the name of the formal
argument when it is unnecessary, e.g., we write int→ bool
for _:int→ Tot bool. We also write #x:t→ t' to indicate that
the argument x is implicitly instantiated.
Our first step is to describe effects using monads built
from total functions (Moggi 1989). For instance, here is the
standard monadic representation of state in F⋆ syntax.
type st (mem:Type) (a:Type) = mem→ Tot (a ∗ mem)
This defines a type st parameterized by types for the mem-
ory (mem) and the result (a). We use st as the representation
type of a new STATE_m effect we add to F⋆, with the total
qualifier enabling the termination checker for STATE_m com-
putations.
total new_effect {
STATE_m (mem:Type) : a:Type→ Effect
with repr = st mem;
return = λ(a:Type) (x:a) (m:mem)→ x, m;
bind = λ(a b:Type) (f:st mem a) (g:a→ st mem b) (m:mem)→
let z, m' = f m in g z m';
get = λ() (m:mem)→m, m; put = λ(m:mem) _→ (), m }
This defines the return and bind of this monad, and two
actions: get for obtaining the current memory, and put for
updating it. The new effect STATE_m is still parameterized by
the type of memories, which allows us to choose a memory
model best suited to the programming and verification task
at hand. We often instantiate mem to heap (a map from ref-
erences to their values, as in ML), obtaining the STATE effect
shown below—we use other memory types in §5 and §6.
total new_effect STATE = STATE_m heap
While such monad definitions could in principle be used
to directly extend the implementation of any functional lan-
guage with the state effect, a practical language needs to
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allow keeping the representation of some effects abstract
so that they are efficiently implemented primitively (Peyton
Jones 2010). F⋆ uses its simple module system to keep the
monadic representation of the STATE effect abstract and im-
plements it under the hood using the ML heap, rather than
state passing (and similarly for other primitive ML effects
such as exceptions). Whether implemented primitively or
not, the monadic definition of each effect is always themodel
used by F⋆ to reason about effectful code, both intrinsically
using a (non-relational) weakest precondition calculus (§2.2)
and extrinsically using monadic reification (§2.3).
For the purpose of verification, monads provide great flex-
ibility in the modeling of effects, which enables us to express
relational properties and to conduct proofs at the right level
of abstraction. For instance, in §5.3 we extend a state monad
with extra ghost state to track declassification, in §4 we de-
fine a monad for random sampling from a uniform distribu-
tion, and in §6.1 we define a partiality monad for memoizing
recursive functions. Moreover, since the difficulty of reason-
ing about effectful code is proportional to the complexity of
the effect, we do not use a single full-featured monad for all
code; instead we define custom monads for sub-effects and
relate them using monadic lifts. For instance, we define a
READER monad for computations that only read the store,
lifting READER to STATE only where necessary (§5.1 pro-
vides a detailed example). While F⋆ code is always written
in an ML-like direct style, the F⋆ typechecker automatically
inserts binds, returns and lifts under the hood (Swamy et al.
2011).
2.2 Unary weakest preconditions for user-defined
effects and intrinsic proof
For each user-defined effect, F⋆ derives a weakest precondi-
tion calculus for specifying unary properties and computing
verification conditions for programs using that effect (Ah-
man et al. 2017). Each effect definition induces a computation
type indexed by a predicate transformer describing that com-
putation’s effectful semantics.
For state, we obtain a computation type ‘STATE a wp’ in-
dexed by a result type a and by wp, a predicate transformer
of type (a→ heap→ Type)→ heap→ Type, mapping post-
conditions (relating the result and final state of the compu-
tation) to preconditions (predicates on the initial state). For
example, the types of the get and put actions of STATE are
specified as:
val get : unit→ STATE heap (λ post (h:heap)→ post h h)
val put : h':heap→ STATE unit (λ post (h:heap)→ post () h')
The type of get states that, in order to prove any postcondi-
tion post of ‘get ()’ evaluated in state h, it suffices to prove
post h h, whereas for put h' it suffices to prove post () h'. F⋆
users find it more convenient to index computations with
pre- and postconditions as in HTT (Nanevski et al. 2008), or
sometimes not at all, using the following abbreviations:
ST a (requires p) (ensures q) = STATE a (λ post h0 →
p h0 ∧ (∀ (x:a) (h1:heap). q h0 x h1 =⇒ post x h1))
St a = ST a (requires (λ _→⊤)) (ensures (λ _ _ _→⊤))
F⋆ computes weakest preconditions generically for any
effect. Intuitively, this works by putting the code into an ex-
plicit monadic form and then translating the binds, returns,
actions, and lifts from the expression level to the weakest pre-
condition level. This enables a convenient form of intrinsic
proof in F⋆, i.e., one annotates a term with a type capturing
properties of interest; F⋆ computes a weakest precondition
for the term and compares it to the annotated type using a
built-in subsumption rule, checked by an SMT solver.
For example, in the code below, F⋆ checks that the inferred
computation type is sufficient to prove that a noop function
leaves the memory unchanged.
For a more interesting example,the sum_up function from
§1.1 can be given the following type:
r:ref int→ lo:nat→ hi:nat{hi ≥ lo}→
ST unit (requires λh→ r ∈ h) (ensures λ_ _ h→ r ∈ h)
This is a dependent function type, for a functionwith three
arguments r, lo, and hi returning a terminating, stateful com-
putation. The refinement type hi:nat{hi ≥ lo} restricts hi to
only those natural numbers greater than or equal to lo. The
computation type of ‘sum_up r lo hi’ simply requires and en-
sures that its reference argument r is present in the memory.
F⋆ computes a weakest precondition from the implementa-
tion of sum_up (using the types of (!) and (:=) provided by
the heap memory model used by STATE) and proves that
its inferred specification is subsumed by the user-provided
annotation. The same type can also be given to sum_dn.
2.3 Exposing effect definitions via monadic
reification
Intrinsic proofs of effectful programs in F⋆ are inherently
restricted to unary properties. Notably, pre- and postcondi-
tions are required to be pure terms, making it impossible for
specifications to refer directly to effectful code, e.g., sum_up
cannot directly use itself or sum_dn in its specification. To
overcome this restriction, we need a way to coerce a ter-
minating effectful computation to its underlying monadic
representation which is a pure term—Filinski’s 1994 monadic
reification provides just that facility.2
Each new effect in F⋆ induces a reify operator that exposes
the representation of an effectful computation in terms of its
underlying monadic representation (Ahman et al. 2017). For
the STATE effect, F⋆ provides the following (derived) rule for
reify, to coerce a stateful computation to a total, explicitly
state-passing function of type heap→ t ∗ heap. The argu-
ment and result types of reify e are refined to capture the
2Less frequently, we use reify’s dual, reflect, which packages a pure
function as an effectful computation.
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pre- and postconditions intrinsically proved for e .
S ; Γ ⊢ e : ST t (requires pre) (ensures post)
S ; Γ ⊢ reify e : h:heap{pre h}→ Tot (r:(t∗heap){post h (fst r) (snd r)})
The semantics of reify is to traverse the term and to grad-
ually expose the underlying monadic representation. We
illustrate this below for STATE, where the constructs on the
right-hand side of the rules are the pure implementations
of return, bind, put, and get as defined on page 3, but with
type arguments left implicit:
reify (return e) { STATE.return e
reify (bind x← e1 in e2) { STATE.bind (reify e1)(λx→ reify e2)
reify (get e) { STATE.get e
reify (put e) { STATE.put e
Armed with reify, we can write an extrinsic proof of a
lemma relating sum_up and sum_dn (discussed in detail
in §2.4), i.e., an “after the fact” proof that is separate from
the definition of sum_up and sum_dn and that relates their
reified executions. We further remark that in F⋆ the standard
operational semantics of effectful computations is modeled
in terms of reification, so proving a property about a reified
computation is really the same as proving the property about
the evaluation of the computation itself.
The reify operator clearly breaks the abstraction of the
underlying monad and needs to be used with care. Ahman
et al. (2017) show that programs that do not use reify (or
its converse, reflect) can be compiled efficiently. Specifically,
if the computationally relevant part of a program is free of
reify then the STATE computations can be compiled using
primitive state with destructive updates.
To retain these benefits of abstraction, we rely on F⋆’s
module system to control how the abstraction-breaking reify
coercion can be used in client code. In particular, when ab-
straction violations cannot be tolerated, we use F⋆’s Ghost
effect (explained in §2.4) to mark reify as being usable only in
computationally irrelevant code, limiting the use of monadic
reification to specifications and proofs. This allows one to
use reification even though effects like state and exceptions
are implemented primitively in F⋆.
2.4 Extrinsic specification and proof, eased by
SMT-based automation
We now look at the proof relating sum_up and sum_dn in
detail, explaining along the way several F⋆-specific idioms
that we find essential to making our method work well.
Computational irrelevance (Ghost effect) The Ghost
effect is used to track a form of computational irrelevance.
Ghost t (requires pre) (ensures post) is the type of a pure
computation returning a value of type t satisfying post, pro-
vided pre is valid. However, this computation must be erased
before running the program, so it can only be used in speci-
fications and proofs.
Adding proof irrelevance (Lemma) F⋆ provides two
closely related forms of proof irrelevance. First, a pure term
e:t can be given the refinement type x:t{ϕ} when it validates
the formula ϕ[e/x], although no proof of ϕ is materialized.
For example, borrowing the terminology of Nogin (2002), the
value () is a squashed proof of u:unit{0 ≤ 1}. Combining proof
and computation irrelevance, e : Ghost unit pre (λ()→ post)
is a squashed proof of pre→ post. This latter form is so com-
mon that we write it as Lemma (requires pre) (ensures post),
further abbreviated as Lemma post when pre is ⊤.
Proof relating sum_up and sum_dn Spelling out the
main lemma of §1.1, our goal is a value of the following type:
val eq_sum_up_dn (r:ref int)(lo:int)(hi:int{hi ≥ lo})(h:heap{r ∈ h})
: Lemma
(v r (reify (sum_up r lo hi) h) == v r (reify (sum_dn r lo hi) h))
where v r (_, h) = h.[r] and h.[r] selects the contents of the
reference r from the heap h.
An attempt to give a trivial definition for eqsum_up_dn
that simply returns a unit value () fails, because the SMT
solver cannot automatically prove the strong postcondition
above. Instead our proof involves calling an auxiliary lemma
sum_up_dn_aux, proving a ternary relation:
val sum_up_dn_aux (r:ref int) (lo:int) (mid:int{mid ≥ lo})
(hi:int{hi ≥ mid}) (h:heap{r ∈ h})
: Lemma (v r (reify (sum_up r lo hi) h)
== v r (reify (sum_dn r lo mid) h)
+ v r (reify (sum_up r mid hi) h) − h.[r])
(decreases (mid − lo))
let eq_sum_up_dn r lo hi h = sum_up_dn_aux r lo hi hi h
While the statement of eq_sum_up_dn is different from the
statement of sum_up_dn_aux, the SMT-based automation
fills in the gaps and accepts the proof sketch. In particular,
the SMT solver figures out that sum_up r hi hi is a no-op by
looking at its reified definition. In other cases, the user has
to provide more interesting proof sketches that include not
only calls to lemmas that the SMT solver cannot automati-
cally apply but also the cases of the proof and the recursive
structure. This is illustrated by the proofof sum_up_dn_aux:
let rec sum_up_dn_aux r lo mid hi h =
if lo , mid then (sum_up_dn_aux r lo (mid − 1) hi h;
sum_up_commute r mid hi (mid − 1) h;
sum_dn_commute r lo (mid − 1) (mid − 1) h)
This proof is by induction on the difference betweenmid and
lo (as illustrated by the decreases clause of the lemma, this
is needed because we are working with potentially-negative
integers). If this difference is zero, then the property is trivial
since the SMT solver can figure out that sum_dn r lo lo is a
no-op. Otherwise, we call sum_up_dn_aux recursively for
mid − 1 as well as two further commutation lemmas (not
shown) about sum_up and sum_dn and the SMT automation
can take care of the rest.
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Encoding computations to SMT So how did F⋆ figure
out automatically that sum_up r hi hi and sum_dn r lo lo are
no-ops? For a start the F⋆ normalizer applied the semantics of
reify sketched in §2.3 to partially evaluate the term and reveal
the monadic representation of the STATE effect by traversing
the term and unfolding the monadic definitions of return,
bind, actions and lifts. In the case of reify (sum_up r hi hi) h,
for instance, reduction intuitively proceeds as follows:
reify (sum_up r hi hi) h
{ reify (if hi , hi then (r := !r + lo; sum_up r (lo + 1) hi)) h
{∗ if hi , hi then (STATE.bind (reify (Ref.read r) h) (λ x→
STATE.bind (reify (Ref.upd r (x + lo)))
(λ _→ reified_sum_up r (hi + 1) hi))) h
else STATE.return () h
{∗ if hi , hi then let x, h' = reify (Ref.read r) h in
let _, h'' = reify (Ref.upd r (x + lo)) h' in
reified_sum_up r (hi + 1) hi h''
else ((), h)
What is left is pure monadic code that F⋆ then encodes to
the SMT solver in a way that allows it to reason by compu-
tation (Aguirre et al. 2016). For reify (sum_up r hi hi) h the
SMT solver can trivially show that hi , hi is false and thus
the computation returns the pair ((), h).
While our work did not require any extension to F⋆’s
theory (Ahman et al. 2017), we significantly improved F⋆’s
logical encoding to perform normalization of open terms
based on the semantics of reify (a kind of symbolic execution)
before calling the SMT solver. This allowed us to scale and
validate the theory of Ahman et al. (2017) from a single 2-
line example to the ≈4,300 lines of relationally verified code
presented in this paper.
2.5 Empirical evaluation of our methodology
For this first example, we reasoned directly about the se-
mantics of two effectful terms to prove their equivalence.
However, we often prefer more structured reasoning princi-
ples to prove or enforce relational properties, e.g., by using
program logics, syntax-directed type systems, or even dy-
namic analyses. In the rest of this paper, we show through
several case studies, that these approaches can be accommo-
dated, and even composed, within our framework.
Table 1 summarizes the empirical evaluation from these
case studies. Each row describes a specific case study, its size
in lines of source code, and the verification time using F⋆ and
the Z3-4.5.1 SMT solver. The verification timeswere collected
on an Intel Xeon E5-2620 at 2.10 GHz and 32GB of RAM. The
“1st run” column indicates the time it takes F⋆ and Z3 to find a
proof. This proof is then used to generate hints (unsat cores)
that can be used as a starting point to verify subsequent
versions of the program. The “replay” column indicates the
time it takes to verify the program given the hints recorded
in the first run. Proof replay is usually significantly faster,
indicating that although finding a proof may initially be quite
Subject Section 1st run (ms) Replay (ms) Loc
Loops 1.1 218192 8943 127
Reorderings 3.1 9239 4749 158
Benton (2004) 3.3 832706 22920 1352
Cryptography 4 17307 10015 530
Static IFC 5.1 68525 15909 730
Hybrid IFC 5.2 55472 1038 34
Declassification 5.3 63763 9811 208
IFC Monitor 5.4 44589 11480 502
Memoization 6.1 12198 12294 427
Union-find 6.2 89838 33455 295
Total 1411829 130614 4363
Table 1. Code size (lines of code without comments) and
proof-checking time (ms) for our examples.
expensive, revising a proof with hints is fast, which greatly
aids interactive proof development.
3 Correctness of program transformations
Several researchers have devised custom program logics for
verifying transformations of imperative programs (Barthe
et al. 2009; Benton 2004; Carbin et al. 2012). We show how
to derive similar rules justifying the correctness of generic
program transformations within our monadic framework.
We focus on stateful programs with a fixed-domain, finite
memory. We leave proving transformations of commands
that dynamically allocate memory to future work.
3.1 Generic transformations based on read- and
write-footprints
Here and in the next subsection, we represent a command c
as a function of type unit→ St unit that may read or write
arbitrary references in memory.
type command = unit→ St unit
In trying to validate transformations of commands, it is tra-
ditional to employ an effect system to delimit the parts of
memory that a command may read or write. Most effect
systems are unary, syntactic analyses. For example, consider
the classic frame rule from separation logic:
{P}c{Q} ⇒ {P ∗ R}c{Q ∗ R}
The command c requires ownership of a subset of the heap
P in order to execute, then returns ownership of Q to its
caller. Any distinct heap fragment R remains unaffected by
the function. Reading this rule as an effect analysis, one
may conclude that c may read or write the P-fragment of
memory—however, this is just an approximation of c’s ex-
tensional behavior. Benton et al. (2006) observe that a more
precise, semantic characterization of effects arises from a
relational perspective. Adopting this perspective, one can
define the footprint of a command extensionally, using two
unary properties and one binary property.
Capturing a command’s write effect is easy with a unary
property, ‘writes c ws’ stating that the initial and final heaps
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agree on the contents of their references, except for those in
the setws.
type addrs = S.set addr
let writes (c:command) (ws:addrs) = ∀(h:heap).
let h' = snd (reify (c ()) h) in
(∀ r. r ∈ h⇐⇒ r ∈ h') ∧ (∗ no allocation ∗)
(∀ r. addr_of r < ws =⇒ h.[r] == h'.[r]) (∗ no changes except ws∗)
Stating that a command only reads references rs is similar
in spirit to the statement of noninterference (to which we re-
turn in §5.1). Interestingly, it is impossible to describe the set
of locations that a command may read without also speaking
about the locations it may write. The relation ‘reads c rs ws’
states that if c writes at most the references in ws, then exe-
cuting c in heaps that agree on the references in rs produces
heaps that agree on ws, i.e., c does not depend on references
outside rs.
let equiv_on (rs:addr_set) (h0:heap) (h1:heap) =
∀a (r:ref a). addr_of r ∈ rs ∧ r ∈ h0 ∧ r ∈ h1 =⇒ h0.[r] == h1.[r]
let reads (c:command) (rs ws:addrs) = ∀(h0 h1: heap).
let h'0, h'1 = snd (reify (c ()) h0), snd (reify (c ()) h1) in
(equiv_on rs h0 h1 ∧ writes c ws) =⇒ equiv_on ws h'0 h'1
Putting the pieces together, we define a read- and write-
footprint-indexed type for commands:
type cmd (rs ws:addrs) = c:command{writes c ws ∧ reads c rs ws}
One can also define combinators to manipulate footprint-
indexed commands. For example, here is a ‘>>’ combinator
for sequential composition. Its type proves that read and
write-footprints compose by a pointwise union, a higher-
order relational property; the proof requires an (omitted)
auxiliary lemma seq_lem (recall that variables preceded by
a # are implicit arguments):
let seq (#r1 #w1 #r2 #w2 : addrs) (c1:cmd r1 w1) (c2:cmd r2 w2) :
command = c1(); c2()
let (>>) #r1 #w1 #r2 #w2 (c1:cmd r1 w1) (c2:cmd r2 w2) :
cmd (r1 ∪ r2) (w1 ∪ w2) = seq_lem c1 c2; seq c1 c2
3.2 Several transformations on commands
Making use of relational footprints, we can prove other rela-
tions between commands, e.g., equivalences that justify pro-
gram transformations. Command equivalence c0 ∼ c1 states
that running c0 and c1 in identical initial heaps produces
(extensionally) equal final heaps.
let (∼) (c0:command) (c1:command) = ∀h.
let h0, h1 = snd (reify (c0 ()) h), snd (reify (c1 ()) h) in
∀(r:ref α ). (r ∈ h0 ⇐⇒ r ∈ h1) ∧ (r ∈ h0 =⇒ h0.[r] == h1.[r])
Our first equivalence, listed below, shows that if a com-
mand’s read and write footprints are disjoint, then it is idem-
potent. The proofs of idem and the other lemmas below are
perhaps peculiar to SMT-based proofs. In all cases, the proofs
involve simply mentioning the terms reify (c ()) h, which suf-
fice to direct the SMT solver’s quantifier instantiation engine
towards finding a proof. While more explicit proofs are cer-
tainly possible, with experience, concise SMT-based proofs
can be easier to write.
let idem #rs #ws (c:cmd rs ws):
Lemma (requires (disjoint rs ws)) (ensures ((c >> c) ∼ c))
= ∀_intro (λ h→ let (), h1 = reify (c ()) h in
let _ = reify (c ()) h1 in ()
<: Lemma (equiv_on_h (c >> c) c h))
Our next equivalence shows that two commands can be
swapped if theywrite to disjoint sets, and if the read footprint
of one does not overlap with the write footprint of the other—
this lemma is identical to a rule for swapping commands in
a logic presented by Barthe et al. (2009).
let swap #rs1 #rs2 #ws1 #ws2 (c1:cmd rs1 ws1) (c2:cmd rs2 ws2)
:Lemma (requires (disjoint ws1 ws2 ∧ disjoint rs1 ws2 ∧
disjoint rs2 ws1))
(ensures ((c1 >> c2) ∼ (c2 >> c1)))
= ∀_intro (λ h→ let _ = reify (c1 ()) h, reify (c2 ()) h in
() <: Lemma (equiv_on_h (c1 >> c2) (c2 >> c1) h))
Next, we show elimination of redundant writes by proving
that c1 >> c2 is equivalent to c2 if c1’s write footprint is (a)
a subset of c2’s write footprint, and (b) disjoint from c2’s
readfootprint.
let redundant_writes #rs1 #rs2 #ws1 #ws2
(c1:cmd rs1 ws1) (c2:cmd rs2 ws2)
: Lemma (requires (disjoint ws1 rs2 ∧ ws1 ⊆ ws2))
(ensures ((c1 >> c2) ∼ c2))
= ∀_intro (λ h→ let _ = reify (c1 ()) h, reify (c2 ()) h in
() <: Lemma (equiv_on_h (c1 >> c2) c2 h))
3.3 Relational Hoare Logic
Beyond generic footprint-based transformations, one may
also prove program-specific equivalences. Several logics have
been devised for this, including, e.g., Benton’s 2004 Relational
Hoare logic (RHL). We show how to derive RHL within our
framework by proving the soundness of each of its rules as
lemmas about a program’s reification.
Model To support potentially diverging computations, we
instrument shallowly-embedded effectful computations with
a fuel argument, where the value of the fuel is irrelevant for
the behavior of a terminating computation.
type comp = f: (fuel:nat→ St bool)
{ ∀h fuel fuel' . fst (reify (f fuel) h) == true ∧ fuel' > fuel
=⇒ reify (f fuel') h == reify (f fuel) h }
let terminates_on c h = ∃fuel . fst (reify (c fuel) h) == true
We model effectful expressions whose evaluation always
terminates and does not change the memory state, and as-
signments, conditionals, sequences of computations, and
potentially diverging while loops.
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Deriving RHL An RHL judgement ‘related c1 c2 pre post’
(where c1, c2 are effectful computations, and pre, post are
relations over memory states) means that the executions
of c1, c2 starting (respectively)in memories h1, h2 related by
pre, both diverge or both terminate with memories h1', h2'
related by post.
let related (c1 c2 : comp) (pre post: (heap→ heap→ prop)) =
(∗ if precondition holds on initial memory states, then ∗)
∀h1 h2 . pre h1 h2 =⇒
(∗ c1 and c2 both terminate or both diverge, and ∗)
((c1 `terminates_on` h1⇐⇒ c2 `terminates_on` h2) ∧
(∀ fuel h1' h2' . (reify (c1 fuel) h1 == (true, h1') ∧
reify (c2 fuel) h2 == (true, h2')) =⇒ (∗ if both terminate, ∗)
post h1' h2')) (∗ postcondition holds on final memory states ∗)
From these reification-based definitions, we prove every
rule of RHL. Of the 20 rules and equations of RHL presented
by Benton (2004), 16 need at most 5 lines of proof annotation
each, among which 10 need none and are proven automati-
cally. Rules related to while loops often require some manual
induction on the fuel. Thus, modeling computations, pro-
gram logic rules, and their soundness proofs amount about
1500 lines of F* code overall.
(∗ Example of fully automatic soundness proof: dead while ∗)
let r_dwhll (b: exp bool) (c: computation)
(Φ: (heap→ heap→ prop)) : Lemma
(ensures (related (while b c) skip (Φ ∧ ¬bleft) (Φ ∧ ¬bleft))) = ()
With RHL in hand, we can prove program equivalences ap-
plying syntax-directed rules, focusing the intellectual effort
on finding and proving inductive invariants to relate loop
bodies. When RHL is not powerful enough, we can escape
back to the reification of commands to complete a direct
proof in terms of the operational semantics.
Example Following Benton (2004), we prove an example
hoisting an assignment out of a loop:
⊢
while (I < N )
X := Y + 1;
I := I + X
L
⇝
X := Y + 1;
while (I < N )
I := I + X
R
:
Ileft = Iright∧
Nleft = Nright∧
Yleft = Yright
Φ
⇛
Ileft = Iright∧
Nleft = Nright∧
Yleft = Yright
In other words, the judgement above preserves the invariant
Φ stating that the two programs L and R compute the same
values for I ,N ,Y , with X being neglected (which is already
useful enough ifX is known to be dead in the code following
the while loops).
let proof () : Lemma (ensures (related L R Φ Φ)) =
(∗ intermediate invariants for the loop bodies ∗)
let Φ1 = Φ ∧ (Xright = Yright + 1) in
let Φ2 = Φ1 ∧ (Xleft = Xright) in
assert (related skip (assign X (Y + 1)) Φ Φ1); (∗ dead assign ∗)
assert (related (assign X (Y + 1)) skip Φ1 Φ2); (∗ dead assign ∗)
assert (related (assign I (I + X )) (assign I (I + X )) Φ2 Φ2); (∗ assign ∗)
assert (related (seq (assign X (Y + 1)) (assign I (I + X )))
(assign i (I + X )) Φ1 Φ2); (∗ seq, elim. skip ∗)
r_while (I < N ) (I < N ) (seq (assign X (Y + 1)) (assign I (I + X )))
(assign I (I + X )) Φ1;
(∗ seq, elim. skip ∗)
assert (related L (while (I < N ) (assign I (Y + 1))) Φ1 Φ)
r_while B B′ C C ′ Φ :
⊢ C ⇝ C ′ : Φ ∧ Bleft ∧ B′right ⇛ Φ ∧ (Bleft = B′right)
⊢ while B do C ⇝ while B′ do C ′ : Φ ∧ (Bleft = B′right)⇛
Φ ∧ ¬(Bleft ∨ B′right)
The proof shows that applications of RHL rules (including
dead assignment rules) are actually syntax-directed, so that
the only nontrivial effort needed is to provide the intermedi-
ate verification condition relating the bodies of the loops.
In more detail, for a given proposition ϕ, assert ϕ tries to
prove ϕ and, if successful, adds ϕ to the proof context as a
fact that can be automatically reused by the later parts of
the proof. To prove ϕ, proof search relies not only on the
current proof context, but also on those lemmas in the global
context that are associated with triggering patterns: if the
shape of ϕ matches the triggering pattern of some lemma f
in the global context, then f is applied (triggered) and the
proof search recursively goes on with the preconditions of
f . This proof search is actually performed by the Z3 SMT
solver through e-matching (Moura and Bjørner 2007).
In our example proof, assert (related skip (assign X (Y + 1)) Φ Φ1)
tries to prove that an assignment can be erased; based on
the syntax of both commands of the relation, e-matching
successfully selects the corresponding dead assignment rule
of RHL. In fact, this assert also allows specifying the inter-
mediate condition Φ1 that is to be used to verify the rest of
the bodies of L and R, which cannot always be guessed by
proof search. Alternatively, the user can also explicitly apply
an RHL rule by directly calling the corresponding lemma,
which is illustrated by the call to r_while to prove that the
two while loops are related. In that case, the postcondition of
the lemma is added to the proof context for the remainder of
the proof. This way, the user can avoid explicitly spelling out
the fact proven by the lemma; moreover, since the lemma to
apply is explicitly given, the SMT solver only has to prove
the preconditions of the lemma, if any.
This example is 33 lines of F* code and takes 25 seconds to
check. This time could be improved substantially. However,
perhaps more interesting, this experiment suggests devel-
oping tactics to automatically use Benton’s RHL whenever
possible, while still keeping the possibility to escape back to
semantic approaches wherever RHL is not powerful enough.
We leave this as future work.
A Monadic Framework for Relational Verification 9
4 Cryptographic security proofs
We show how to construct a simple model for reasoning
about probabilistic programs that sample values from dis-
crete distributions. In this model, we prove the soundness of
rules of probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic (pRHL) (Barthe
et al. 2009) allowing one to derive (in-)equalities on prob-
ability quantities from pRHL judgments. We illustrate our
approach by formalizing two simple cryptographic proofs:
the perfect secrecy of one-time pad encryption and a crucial
lemma used by Barthe et al. (2009) in the proof of semantic
security of ElGamal encryption .
The simplicity of our examples pales in comparison with
complex proofs formalized in specialized tools based on
pRHL like EasyCrypt (Barthe et al. 2012) or FCF (Petcher and
Morrisett 2015), yet our examples hint at a way to prototype
and explore proofs in pRHL with a low entry cost.
4.1 A monad for random sampling
We begin by defining a monad for sampling from the uniform
distribution over bitvectors of a fixed length q. We implement
the monad as the composition of the state and exception
monads where the state is a finite tape of bitvector values
together with a pointer to a position in the tape. The RAND
effect provides a single action, sample, which reads from
the tape the value at the current position and advances the
pointer to the next position, or raises an exception if the
pointer is past the end of the tape.
type value = bv q
type tape = seq value
type id = i:N{i < size}
type store = id ∗ tape
type rand a = store→M (option a ∗ id)
total new_effect {
RAND: a:Type→ Effect
with repr = rand a;
bind = λ(a b:Type) (c:rand a) (f:a→ rand b) s→
let r, next = c s in
match r with
| None→None, next
| Some x→ f x (next, snd s);
return = λ(a:Type) (x:a) (next,_)→ (Some x, next);
sample = λ() s→ let next, t = s in
if next + 1 < size then (Some (t n), n + 1)
else (None, n) }
effect Rand a = RAND a (λ initial_tape post→∀x. post x)
Assuming a uniform distribution over initial tapes, we
define the unnormalized measure of a function p:a→N
with respect to the denotation of a reified computation in
f :Rand a as let mass f p = sum (λt→ let r,_ = f (0, t) in p r)
where sum: (tape→N)→N is the summation operator over
finite tapes. When p only takes values in {0, 1}, it can be re-
garded as an event whose probability with respect to the
distribution generated by f is
Pr[f : p] = 1|tape| ×
∑
t ∈ tape
p (fst (f t)) = mass f p|tape|
Weuse the shorthand Pr[f = v] = |tape|−1×mass f (pointv)
for the probability of a successful computation returning a
valuev , where let point x = λy→ if y = Some x then 1 else 0.
4.2 Perfect secrecy of one-time pad encryption
The following effectful program uses a one-time key k sam-
pled uniformly at random to encrypt a bitvectorm:
let otp (m:value) : Rand value = let k = sample () in m ⊕ k
We show that this construction, known as one-time pad, pro-
vides perfect secrecy. That is, a ciphertext does not give away
any information about the encrypted plaintext, provided
the encryption key is used just once. Or equivalently, the
distribution of the one-time pad encryption of a message is
independent of the message itself, ∀m0, m1, c . Pr[otpm0 =
c] = Pr[otpm1 = c]. We prove this by applying two rules of
pRHL, namely [R-Rand] and [PrLe]. The former allows us to
relate the results of two probabilistic programs by showing
a bijection over initial random tapes that would make the
relation hold (intuitively, permuting equally probable initial
tapes does not change the resulting distribution over final
tapes). The latter allows us to infer a probability inequality
from a proven relation between probabilistic programs. To-
gether, the two rules allow us to prove the following lemma:
val mass_leq: #a:Type→ #b:Type→
c1:(store→M (a ∗ id))→ c2:(store→M (b ∗ id))→
p1:(a→ nat)→ p2:(b→ nat)→ bij:bijection→ Lemma
(requires (∀ t. let r1,_ = c1 (to_id 0,t) in
let r2,_ = c2 (to_id 0,bij.f t) in p1 r1 ≤ p2 r2))
(ensures (mass c1 p1 ≤ mass c2 p2))
The proof is elementary from rearranging terms in summa-
tions according to the given bijection. The following secrecy
proof of one-time pad is immediate from this lemma using as
bijection on initial tapes the function λt→ upd t 0 (t 0 ⊕ m0 ⊕ m1):
val otp_secure: m0:value→m1:value→ c:value→ Lemma
(let f0, f1 = reify (otp m0), reify (otp m1) in
mass f0 (point c) == mass f1 (point c))
4.3 A step in the proof of semantic security of
ElGamal encryption
Another example following a similar principle is a proba-
bilistic equivalence used in the proof of semantic security of
ElGamal encryption by Barthe et al.’s 2009. This equivalence,
named mult_pad in that paper, proves the independence of
the adversary’s view from the hidden bit b that the adver-
sary has to guess in the semantic security indistinguishability
game, and thus shows that the adversary cannot do better
than a random guess.
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ElGamal encryption is parametric on a cyclic group of
order q, and a generator д. Roughly stated, the equivalence
says that if one applies the group operation to a uniformly
distributed element of the group and some other element, the
result is uniformly distributed, that is z $← Zq ; ζ ← дz ×mb
and z $← Zq ; ζ ← дz induce the same distribution on ζ
(which is thus independent of b). To prove this, we modify
theRAND effect to use random tapes of elements ofZq rather
than bitvectors, an define
let elgamal0 (m:group) : Rand group = let z = sample () in g^z
let elgamal1 (m:group) : Rand group = let z = sample () in (g^z) ∗ m
and prove, again using mass_leq, the following lemma
val elgamal_equiv: m:group→ c:group→ Lemma
(let f1, f2 = reify (elgamal0 m), reify (elgamal1 m) in
mass f1 (point c) == mass f2 (point c))
5 Information-flow control
In this section, we present a case study examining various
styles of information-flow control (IFC), a security paradigm
based on noninterference (Goguen and Meseguer 1982), a
property that compares two runs of a program differing
only in the program’s secret inputs and requires the non-
secret outputs to be equal. Many special-purpose systems,
including syntax-directed type systems, have been devised
to enforce noninterference-like security properties (see, e.g.,
Hedin and Sabelfeld 2012; Sabelfeld and Myers 2006).
We start our IFC case study by encoding a classic IFC type
system (Volpano et al. 1996) for a small deeply-embedded im-
perative language and proving its correctness (§5.1). In order
to augment the permissiveness of our analysis we then show
how to compose our IFC type system with precise semantic
proofs (§5.2). As IFC is often too strong for practical use, the
final step in our IFC case study is a semantic treatment of
declassification based on delimited release (Sabelfeld and
Myers 2003b) (§5.3). An additional case study on a runtime
monitor for IFC is presented in §5.4. We conclude that our
method for relational verification is flexible enough to ac-
commodate various IFC disciplines, allowing comparisons
and compositions within the same framework.
5.1 Deriving an IFC type system
Consider the following small while language consisting of
expressions, which may only read from the heap, but not
modify it, and commands, which may write to the heap
and branch, depending on its contents. The definition of the
language should be unsurprising, the only subtlety worth
noting is the decr expression in the while command, a metric
used to ensure loop termination.
e ::= i | r | e1 ⊕ e2
c ::= skip | r := e | c1; c2 | if e = 0 then c1 else c2
| while e , 0 do c (decr e ′)
ESub
Γ ⊢ e : l1 l1 ≤ l2
Γ ⊢ e : l2
EVar
Γ ⊢ r : Γ (r )
EInt
i : int
Γ ⊢ i : L
EBinOp
Γ ⊢ e1 : l Γ ⊢ e2 : l
Γ ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 : l
CSub
Γ, pc : l1 ⊢ c l2 ≤ l1
Γ, pc : l2 ⊢ c
CAssign
Γ ⊢ e : Γ (r )
Γ, pc : Γ (r ) ⊢ r := e
CSeq
Γ, pc : l ⊢ c1 Γ, pc : l ⊢ c2
Γ, pc : l ⊢ c1; c2
CCond
Γ ⊢ e : l Γ, pc : l ⊢ c1 Γ, pc : l ⊢ c2
Γ, pc : l ⊢ if e = 0 then c1 else c2
CWhile
Γ ⊢ e : l Γ, pc : l ⊢ c Γ ⊢ e ′ : l ′
Γ, pc : l ⊢ while e , 0 do c (decr e ′)
CSkip Γ, pc : H ⊢ skip
Figure 1. A classic IFC type system
A classic IFC type system Volpano et al. (1996) devise
an IFC type system for a similar language to check that
programs executing over a memory containing both secrets
(stored in memory locations labeled High) and non-secrets
(in locations labeled Low) never leak secrets into non-secret
locations. The type system includes two judgments Γ ⊢ e : l ,
which states that the expression e (with free variables in Γ)
depends only on locations labeled l or lower; and Γ, pc : l ⊢ c ,
which states that a command c in a context that is control-
dependent on the contents of memory locations labeled l ,
does not leak secrets. The main of their system, as adapted
to our example language, are shown in Figure 1.
Our goal in this section is to embed this while language in
F⋆, to define an interpreter for it, and to derive Volpano et
al.’s type system by relating multiple runs of the interpreter.
In doing so, we highlight several distinctive features of our
approach, including the use of multiple monads to structure
our interpreter and simplify our proofs.
Multiple effects to structure the while interpreter We
deeply embed the syntax of while in F⋆ using data types
exp and com, for expressions and commands, respectively.
The expression interpreter interp_exp only requires reading
the value of the variables from the store, whereas the com-
mand interpreter, interp_com, also requires writes to the
store, where store is an integer store mapping a fixed set of
integer references ‘ref int’ to int. Additionally, interp_com
may also raise anOut_of_fuel exception when it detects that
a loop may not terminate (e.g., because the claimed metric is
not actually decreasing). We could define both interpreters
using a single effect, but this would require us to prove that
interp_exp does not change the store and does not raise ex-
ceptions. Avoiding the needless proof overhead, we use a
Reader monad for interp_exp and StExn, a combined state
and exceptions monad, for interp_com. By defining Reader
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as a sub_effect of StExn, expression interpretation is trans-
parently lifted by F⋆ to the larger effect when interpreting
commands.
type reader (a:Type) = store→ Tot a
total new_effect { READER : a:Type→ Effect
with repr = reader;
return = λ(a:Type) (x:a) (s:store)→ x;
bind = λ(a b : Type) (f:reader a) (g: a→ reader b) (s:store)→
let z = f s in g z s; get = λ() (s:store)→ s }
type stexn (a:Type) = store→ Tot (either a exn ∗ store)
total new_effect { STEXN . . . }
sub_effect READER{STEXN
{ lift = λ(a:Type) (f:reader a) (s:store)→ let x = f s in (Inl x, s) }
Using these effects, interp_exp and interp_com form a stan-
dard, recursive, definitional interpreter for while, with the
following trivial signatures. Just as we sometimes use St, the
unindexed version of STATE, here we use Reader and StExn,
unindexed versions of READER and STEXN with simple pre-
and postconditions.
val interp_exp: exp→Reader int
val interp_com: com→ StExn unit
Similarly, the memoization example from §6.1 uses an
effect that is specialized to the target application: a state
monad where the state is a partial finite map storing all
arguments on which a particular function was called and
what answers it returned.
Deriving IFC typing for expressions For starters, we use
a store_labeling = ref int→ label, where label ∈ {High, Low},
to partition the store between secrets (High) and non-secrets
(Low). An expression is noninterferent at level l when its
interpretation does not depend on locations labeled greater
than l in the store. To formalize this, we define a notion of
low-equivalence on stores, relating stores that agree on the
contents of all Low-labeled references, and noninterferent
expressions (at level Low, i.e., ni_exp env e Low) as those
whose interpretation is identical in low-equivalent stores.
type low_equiv (env:store_labeling) (s0 s1:store) =
∀(r:ref int). env x=Low =⇒ s0.[r] == s1.[r]
let ni_exp (env:store_labeling) (e:exp) (l:label) =
∀(s0 s1:store). (low_equiv env s0 s1 ∧ l == Low) =⇒
reify (interp_exp e) s0 == reify (interp_exp e) s1
With this definition of noninterference for expressions we
capture the semantic interpretation of the typing judgment
Γ ⊢ e : l : if the expression e can be assigned the label Low,
then the computation of e is only influenced by Low values.
Using this definition, we can derive the expression rules of
Figure 1; for instance here is a lemma for the EBinOp rule:
let binop_exp (env:store_labeling) (op:binop) (e1 e2:exp) (l:label)
: Lemma (requires (ni_exp env e1 l ∧ ni_exp env e2 l))
(ensures (ni_exp env (AOp op e1 e2) l)) = ()
We construct a lemma from the inference rule in a straight-
forward manner: the premise of the inference rule forms the
requires clause, while the conclusion of the rule forms the
ensures clause. The proof for this lemma is simple and can be
discharged purely by SMT, without the need of any further
annotations. The other rules for expressions can be shown
in the same way and all of them can be discharged by SMT.
Deriving IFC typing for commands As explained previ-
ously, the judgment Γ, pc : l ⊢ c deems c noninterferent when
run in context control-dependent only on locations whose
label is at most l . More explicitly, the judgment establishes
the following two properties: (1) locations labeled below l
are not modified by c—this is captured by no_write_down,
a unary property; (2) the command c does not leak the con-
tents of a High location to Low location—this is captured by
ni_com', a binary property.
let run c s = match reify (interp_com c) s with
| Inr Out_of_fuel, _→ Loops | _, s'→Returns s'
let no_write_down env c l s = match run c s with
| Loops→⊤| Returns s'→∀(i:id). env i < l =⇒ s'.[i] == s.[i]
let ni_com' env c l s0 s1 = match run c s0, run c s1 with
| Returns s0', Returns s1'→ low_equiv env s0 s1 =⇒
low_equiv env s0' s1'
| Loops, _ | _, Loops→⊤
The type system is termination-insensitive, meaning that
a program may diverge depending on the value of a secret.
Consider, for instance, two runs of the program while hi
<> 0 do {skip}; lo := 0, one with hi = 0 and another
with hi = 1. The first run terminates and writes to lo; the
second run loops forever. As such, we do not expect to prove
noninterference in case the program loops.
Putting the pieces together, we define Γ, pc : l ⊢ c to be
ni_com Γ c l .
let ni_com (env:store_labeling) (c:com) (l:label) =
(∀ s0 s1. ni_com' env c l s0 s1) ∧ (∀ s. no_write_down env c l s)
As in the case of expression typing, we derive each rule
of the command-typing judgment as a lemma about ni_com.
For example, here is the statement for the CCond rule:
val cond_com (env:store_labeling)(e:exp)(ct:com)(cf:com)(l:label)
: Lemma (requires (ni_exp env e l ∧ ni_com env ct l
∧ ni_com env cf l))
(ensures (ni_com env (If e ct cf) l))
The proofs of many of these rules are partially automated
by SMT—they take about 250 lines of specification and proof
in F⋆. Once proven, we use these rules to build a certified,
syntax-directed typechecker for while programs that repeat-
edly applies these lemmas to prove that a program satisfies
ni_com. This certified typechecker has the following type:
val tc_com : env:store_labeling→ c:com→
Exn label (requires ⊤) (ensures λInl l→ ni_com env c l | _→⊤)
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5.2 Combining syntactic IFC analysis with semantic
noninterference proofs
Building on §5.1, we show how programs that fall outside the
syntactic information-flow typing discipline can be proven
secure using a combination of typechecking and semantic
proofs of noninterference. This example is evocative (though
at a smaller scale) of the work of Küsters et al. (2015), who
combine automated information-flow analysis in the Joana
analyzer (Hammer and Snelting 2009) with semantic proofs
in the KeY verifier for Java programs (Darvas et al. 2005;
Scheben and Schmitt 2011). In contrast, we sketch a combina-
tion of syntactic and semantic proofs of relational properties
in a single framework. Consider the followingwhile program,
where the label of c and lo is Low and the label of hi is High.
while c ,0 do hi := lo + 1; lo := hi + 1; c := c − 1 (decr c)
The assignment lo := hi + 1 is ill-typed in the type system
of §5.1, since it directly assigns a High expression to a Low
location. However, the previous command overwrites hi so
that hi does not contain a High value anymore at that point.
As such, even though the IFC type system cannot prove it, the
program is actually noninterferent. To prove it, one could
directly attempt to prove ni_com for the entire program,
which would require a strong enough (relational) invariant
for the loop. A simpler approach is to prove just the sub-
program hi := lo + 1; lo := hi + 1 (c_s) noninterferent, while
relying on the type system for the rest of the program. The
sub-program can be automatically proven secure:
let c_s_ni () : Lemma (ni_com env c_s Low) = ()
This lemma has exactly the form of the other standard, typ-
ing rules proven previously, except it is specialized to the
command in question. As such, c_s_ni can just be used in
place of the standard sequence-typing rule (CSeq) when
proving the while loop noninterferent.
We can even modify our automatic typechecker from §5.1
to take as input a list of commands that are already proved
noninterferent (by whichever means), and simply look up
the command it tries to typecheck in the list before trying to
typecheck it syntactically. The type (and omitted implemen-
tation) of this typechecker is very similar to that of tc_com,
the only difference is the extra list argument:
val tc_com_hybrid : env:store_labeling→ c:com→
list (cl:(com∗label){ni_com env (fst cl) (snd cl)})→
Exn label (ensures λol→ Inl? ol =⇒ ni_com env c (Inl?.v ol))
We can complete the noninterference proof automatically
by passing the (c_s, Low) pair proved in ni_com by lemma
c_s_ni (or directly by SMT) to this hybrid IFC typechecker:
let c_loop_ni () : Lemma (ensures ni_com env c_loop Low) =
c_s_ni(); ignore (reify (tc_com_hybrid env c_loop [c_s, Low]) ())
Checking this in F⋆ works by simply evaluating the invoca-
tion of tc_com_hybrid; this reduces fully to Inl Low and the
intrinsic type of tc_com_hybrid ensures the postcondition.
5.3 Semantic declassification
Beyond noninterference, reasoning directly about relational
properties allows us to characterize various forms of declas-
sificationwhere programs intentionally reveal some informa-
tion about secrets. For example, Sabelfeld and Myers (2003b)
propose delimited release, a discipline in which programs are
allowed to reveal the value of only certain pure expressions.
In a simple example by Sabelfeld and Myers some amount
of money (k) is transferred from one account (hi) to another
(lo). Simply by observing whether or not the funds are re-
ceived, the owner of the lo account gains some information
about the other account, namely whether or not hi contained
at least k units of currency—this is, however, by design.
let transfer (k:int) (hi:ref int) (lo:ref int) =
if k < !hi then (hi := !hi − k; lo := !lo + k)
To characterize this kind of intentional release of infor-
mation, delimited release describes two runs of a program
in initial states where the secrets, instead of being arbitrary,
are related in some manner, e.g., the initial states agree on
the value of the term being explicitly declassified. This is
easily captured in our setting. For example, we can prove
the following lemma for transfer, which shows that lo gains
no more information than intended.
let transfer_ok (k:int) (hi lo:ref int{addr_of lo ,addr_of hi})
(s0 s1:heap{lo ∈ s0 ∧ hi ∈ s0 ∧ lo ∈ s1 ∧ hi ∈ s1}) : Lemma
(∗ initial memories agree on lo and on the declassified term ∗)
(requires (s0.[lo] == s1.[lo] ∧ (k < s0.[hi]⇐⇒ k < s1.[hi])))
(ensures ((snd (reify (transfer k hi lo) s0)).[lo] ==
(snd (reify (transfer k hi lo) s1)).[lo])) = ()
Delimited release was about the what dimension of declas-
sification (Sabelfeld and Sands 2009). We also built a very
simple model that is targeted at the when dimension, illus-
trating a customization of the monadic model to the target
relational property. For instance, to track when information
is declassified, we augment the state with a bit recording
whether the secret component of the state was declassified
and is thus allowed to be leaked.
type ifc_state = { secret:int; public:int; release:bool }
new_effect STATE_IFC = STATE_h ifc_state
In this case the noninterference property depends on the
extra instrumentation bit we added to the state.
let ni (f:unit→ St unit) =
∀s0 s1. let (_, s0'), (_, s1') = reify (f ()) s0, reify (f ()) s1 in
s0'.release ∨ s1'.release ∨ (low_equiv s0 s1 =⇒ low_equiv s0' s1')
5.4 Soundness of an IFC monitor
Another popular technique for the enforcement of IFC are
runtime monitors: the idea is to dynamically track the se-
curity labels of expressions and to check them at runtime
in order to detect IFC violations, which cause the execution
A Monadic Framework for Relational Verification 13
EVar
S, Γ ⊢ r → ⟨S (r ) , Γ (r )⟩
EInt
i : int
S, Γ ⊢ i → ⟨i, L⟩
EBinOp
S ⊢ e1 → ⟨v1, l1⟩ S, Γ ⊢ e2 → ⟨v2, l2⟩
S, Γ ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 → ⟨v1 ⊕ v2, l1 ⊔ l2⟩
CAssign
S, Γ ⊢ e → ⟨ve , le ⟩ Γ (r ) = lr
le ⊔ pc ≤ lr
S, Γ, pc ⊢ r := e → S [r 7→ ve ]
CCondTrue
S, Γ ⊢ e → ⟨ve , le ⟩ ve = 0 S, Γ, (pc ⊔ le ) ⊢ c1 → S1
S, Γ, pc ⊢ if e = 0 then c1 else c2 → S1
Figure 2. Semantics of the IFC monitor
to halt. Here we implement an interpreter for the while lan-
guage presented in §5.1 extended with the security monitor
proposed by Sabelfeld and Russo (2009): a selection of the
semantic rules is reported in Figure 2. The store S maps refer-
ences to integers, while the store labeling Γ maps references
to security labels, which are then used to derive labels for ex-
pressions. Assignments are subject to the expected security
checks at run-time.
We embed themonitor in F⋆, obtaining amachine-checked
proof of soundness for it. The interpretation functions for
expressions and commands have the following signatures:
val interp_exp_monitor: store_labeling→ exp→Reader (int ∗ label)
val interp_com_monitor: store_labeling→ label→ com→ StExn unit
We prove termination-insensitive non-interference for
interpretation with the monitor and capture this with the
following lemma:
val dyn_ifc (s0:store) (s1:store) (env:store_labeling) (c:com) (pc:label) :
Lemma (requires (low_equiv env s0 s1))
(ensures (match (reify (interp_com_monitor env pc c)) s0,
(reify (interp_com_monitor env pc c)) s1 with
| (Inl _, s0'), (Inl _, s1')→ low_equiv env s0' s1'
| _→⊤))
Intuitively, we show that for any two low-equivalent initial
stores, the two resulting stores are also low equivalent, if
the interpretation with the monitor terminates without a
runtime exception.
While the result looks similar to the one shown for the
type system, there is a subtle difference in the enforced se-
curity property. Consider the following example where the
label of hi is High and the label of lo is Low:
if (hi=0) skip else lo := 0
The assignment to a low reference on the else branch is leak-
ing information about the value of the high reference in the
conditional expression. Nevertheless, if the then-branch of
the conditional is taken, the monitor will not report a viola-
tion, as it does not inspect the else-branch. This example does
however not break our theorem, since our theorem only re-
lates pairs of programs that terminate normally, while for all
stores in which the else branch is taken, the execution of the
interpreter halts with an error. The monitor is collapsing the
implicit-flow channel into an erroneous termination chan-
nel, thereby enforcing error-insensitive non-interference. For
comparison, notice that the (termination-insensitive) type
system from §5.1 accepts a variant of the program above, in
which the low assignment is replaced by a non-terminating
loop.
6 Program optimizations and refinement
This section presents two complete examples to prove a
few, classic algorithmic optimizations correct. These prop-
erties are very specific to their application domains and a
special-purpose relational logic would probably not be suit-
able. Instead, we make use of the generality of our approach
to prove application-specific relational properties (including
4- and 6-ary relations) of higher-order programs with local
state. In contrast, most prior relational logics are specialized
to proving binary relations, or, at best, properties of n runs
of a single first-order program (Sousa and Dillig 2016).
6.1 Effect for memoizing recursive functions
First, we look at memoizing total functions, including mem-
oizing a function’s recursive calls based on a partiality rep-
resentation technique due to McBride (2015). We prove that
a memoized function is extensionally equal to the original.
We define a custom effectMemo, a monadwith a state con-
sisting of a (partial, finite) mapping from a function’s domain
type (dom) to its codomain type (codom), with two actions:
get : dom→Memo (option codom), which returns a memo-
ized value if it exists; and put : dom→ codom→Memo unit,
which adds a new memoization pair to the state.3
Take 1: Memoizing total functions Our goal is to turn a
total function g into a memoized function f computing the
same values as g. This relation between f’s reification and g
is captured by the computes predicate below, depending on
an invariant of the memoization state, valid_memo. A mem-
oization state h is valid for memoizing some total function
g : (dom→ codom) when h is a subset of the graph of g:
let valid_memo (h:memo_st) (g:dom→ codom) =
for_all_prop (λ (x,y)→ y == g x) h
let computes (f: dom→Memo codom) (g:dom→ codom) =
∀h0. valid_memo h0 g =⇒ (∀ x. (let y, h1 = reify (f x) h0 in
y == g x ∧ valid_memo h1 g))
3 This abstract model could be implemented efficiently, for instance by an
imperative hash-table with a specific memory-management policy.
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We have f `computes`g when given any state h0 containing
a subgraph of g, f x returns g x and maintains the invariant
that the result state h1 is a subgraph of g. It is easy to program
and verify a simple memoizing function:
let memoize (g : dom→ codom) (x:dom) =
match get x with Some y→ y | None→ let y = g x in put x y; y
let memoize_computes g :Lemma ((memoize g) `computes` g) = ...
The proof of this lemma is straightforward: we only need to
show that the value y we get back from the heap in the first
branch is indeed g x which is enforced by the valid_memo
in the precondition of computes.
Take 2: Memoizing recursive calls Now, what if we want
tomemoize a recursive function, for example, a function com-
puting the Fibonacci sequence? We also want to memoize
the intermediate recursive calls, and in order to achieve it,
we need an explicit representation of the recursive structure
of the function. Following McBride (2015), we represent
this by a function x:dom→ partial_result x, where a partial
result is either a finished computation of type codom or a
request for a recursive call together with a continuation.
type partial_result (x0:dom) =
| Done : codom→ partial_result x0
| Need : x:dom{x ≺ x0}→ cont:(codom→ partial_result x0)→
partial_result x0
As we define the fixed point using Need x f, we crucially
require x ≺ x0, meaning that the value of the function is re-
quested at a point xwhere function’s definition already exists.
For example encoding Fibonacci amounts to the following
code where the two recursive calls in the second branch have
been replaced by applications of the Need constructor. We
also define the fixpoint of such a function representation f:
let fib_skel (x:dom) : partial_result x =
if x ≤ 1 then Done 1 else
Need (x − 1) (λ y1 →Need (x − 2) (λ y2 →Done (y1 + y2)))
let rec fixp (f: x:dom→ partial_result x) (x0:dom) : codom =
let rec complete_fixp x = function
| Done y→ y
| Need x' cont→ let y = fixp f x' in complete_fixp x (cont y)
in complete_fixp x0 (f x0)
To obtain a memoized fixpoint, we need to memoize func-
tions defined only on part of the domain, x:dom{p x}.
let partial_memoize (p:dom→ Type)
(f : x:dom{p x}→Memo codom) (x:dom{p x}) =
match get x with Some y→ y | None→ let y = g x in put x y; y
let rec memoize_rec (f: x:dom→ partial_result x) (x0:dom) =
let rec complete_memo_rec x :Memo codom = function
| Done y→ y
| Need x' cont→
let y = partial_memoize (λ y→ y ≺ x) (memoize_rec f) x' in
complete_memo_rec (cont y)
in complete_memo_rec x0 (f x0)
Since both functions are syntactically similar it is relatively
easy to prove by structural induction on the code ofmemoize_rec
that, for any skeleton of a recursive function f, we have
that (memoize_rec f) `computes`(fixp f). The harder part is
proving that fixp fib_skel is extensionally equal to fibonacci,
the natural recursive definition of the sequence, as these
two functions are not syntactically similar—however, the
proof involves reasoning only about pure functions. As we
have already proven that memoize_rec fib_skel computes
fixp fib_skel, we easily gain a proof of the equivalence of
memoize_rec fib_skel to fibonacci by transitivity.
Finally, we can encapsulate the Memo effect and provide
a pure state-passing interface:
type memo_pack (f:dom→ codom) =
|MemoPack : h0:memo_st{valid_memo h0 f}→
mf:(dom→Memo codom){mf `computes` f}→memo_pack f
let apply_memo (#f:dom→ codom) (mp:memo_pack f) (x:dom) :
(codom ∗ memo_pack f) =
let MemoPack h0 mf = mp in let y, h1 = reify (mf x) h0 in
y,MemoPack h1 mf
let mk_memo_pack f : memo_pack (fixp f) = memo_lemma f ;
MemoPack [] (memoize_rec f)
6.2 Stepwise refinement and n-ary relations:
Union-find with two optimizations
In this section, we prove several classic optimizations of a
union-find data structure introduced in several stages, each
a refinement. For each refinement step, we employ relational
verification to prove that the refinement preserves the canon-
ical structure of union-find. We specify correctness using, in
some cases, 4- and 6-ary relations, which are easily manipu-
lated in our monadic framework.
Basic union-find implementation A union-find data
structure maintains disjoint partitions of a set, such that
each element belongs to exactly one of the partitions. The
data structure supports two operations: find, that identifies
to which partition an element belongs, and union, that takes
as input two elements and combines their partitions.
An efficient way to implement the union-find data struc-
ture is as a forest of disjoint trees, one tree for each partition,
where each node maintains its parent and the root of each
tree is the designated representative of its partition. The find
operation returns the root of a given element’s partition (by
traversing the parent links), and the union operation simply
points one of the roots to the other.
We represent a union-find of set [0, n − 1] as the type
‘uf_forest n’ (below), a sequence of ref cells, where the ith
element in the sequence is the ith set element, containing its
parent and the list of all the nodes in the subtree rooted at
that node. The list is computationally irrelevant (i.e., erased)—
we only use it to express the disjointness invariant and the
termination metric for recursive functions (e.g. find).
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type elt (n:N) = i:N{i < n} × erased (list N)
type uf_forest (n:N) = s:seq (ref (elt n)){length s = n}
The liveness and disjointness invariants on a union-find
forest are:
(∗ all the refs are distinct and live in the heap ∗)
let live (#n:N) (uf:uf_forest n) (h:heap) =
(∀ i j. i , j⇒ distinct uf[i] uf[j]) ∧ (∀ i. uf[i] ∈ h)
let disjoint (#n:N) (uf:uf_forest n) (h:heap) =
∀ i. i ∈ (subtree uf i h) ∧ (∗ i is in its own subtree ∗)
(∗ set_n is the set of all numbers from 0 to n − 1 ∗)
subtree uf i h ⊆ set_n n ∧
(∗ i's subtree is a subset of its parent's subtree ∗)
is_root i ∨ subtree uf i h ⊂ subtree uf (parent uf i h) h ∧
(∗ disjointness of subtrees ∗)
∀ j. (i , j ∧ is_root uf i h ∧ is_root uf j h)
⇒ subtree uf i h ∩ subtree uf j h = ϕ
The basic find and union operations are shown below,
where set and get are stateful functions that read and write
the ith index in the uf sequence. Reasoning about mutable
pointer structures requires maintaining invariants regarding
the liveness and separation of the memory referenced by
the pointers. While important, these are orthogonal to the
relational refinement proofs—so we elide them here, but still
prove them intrinsically in our code.
let rec find #n uf i = let p, _ =
get uf i in if p = i then i else find uf p
let union #n uf i1 i2 = let r1, r2 = find uf i1, find uf i2 in
let _, s1 = get uf r1 in let _, s2 = get uf r2 in
if r1 ,r2 then (set uf r1 (r2, s1); set uf r2 (r2, union s1 s2))
Union by rank The first optimization we consider is im-
proving union to union_by_rank, which decides whether to
merge r1 into r2, or vice versa, depending on the heights of
each tree, aiming to keep the trees shallow. We prove this
optimization in two steps, first refining the representation
of elements by adding a rank field to elt n and then proving
that union_by_rank maintains the same set partitioning as
union.
type elt (n:N) = i:N{i < n} × N × erased (list nat) (∗ added rank ∗)
We formally reason about the refinement by proving that
the outputs of the find and union functions do not depend on
the newly added rank field. The rank_independence lemma
(a 4-ary relation) states that find and unionwhen run on two
heaps that differ only on the rank field, output equal results
and the resulting heaps also differ only on the rank field.
let equal_but_rank uf h1 h2 = ∀ i. parent uf i h1 = parent uf i h2
∧ subtree uf i h1 = subtree uf i h2
let rank_independence #n uf i i1 i2 h1 h2 : Lemma
(requires (equal_but_rank uf h1 h2))
(ensures (let (r1,f1), (r2,f2) =
reify (find uf i) h1,reify (find uf i) h2 in
let (_,u1), (_,u2) =
reify (union uf i1 i2) h1,reify (union uf i1 i2) h2 in
r1 == r2 ∧ equal_but_rank uf f1 f2 ∧ equal_but_rank uf u1 u2))
Union by rank The rank based union optimization aims
at minimizing the height of the subtrees, so that the tree
traversal is more efficient. It does so by pointing the root with
smaller height to the other root during the union operation.
let union_opt #n uf i1 i2 =
let r1, r2 = find uf i1, find uf i2 in
let _, d1, s1 = get uf r1 in let _, d2, s2 = get uf r2 in
if r1 = r2 then ()
else begin
if d1 < d2 then begin (∗ point r1 to r2 ∗)
set uf r1 (r2, d1, s1); set uf r2 (r2, d2, union s1 s2)
end
else begin (∗ point r2 to r1 and adjust r1's height ∗)
set uf r2 (r1, d2, s2);
let d1 = if d1 = d2 then d1 + 1 else d1 in
set uf r1 (r1, d1, union s1 s2)
end
end
Next, we prove the union_by_rank refinement sound. Sup-
pose we run union and union_by_rank in h on a heap h pro-
ducing h1 and h2. Clearly, we cannot prove that find for a
node j returns the same result in h1 and h2. But we prove
that the canonical structure of the forest is the same in h1
and h2, by showing that two nodes are in the same partition
in h1 if and only if they are in the same partition in h2:
val union_by_rank_refinement #n uf i1 i2 h j1 j2 : Lemma
(let (_, h1), (_, h2) =
reify (union uf i1 i2) h, reify (union_by_rank uf i1 i2) h in
fst (reify (find uf j1) h1) == fst (reify (find uf j2) h1)⇐⇒
fst (reify (find uf j1) h2) == fst (reify (find uf j2) h2))
This property is 6-ary relation, relating 1 run of union
and 1 run of union_by_rank to 4 runs of find—its proof is a
relatively straightforward case analysis.
Path compression Finally, we consider find_compress,
which, in addition to returning the root for an element, sets
the root as the element’s new parent to accelerate subsequent
find queries.
let rec find_opt #n uf i =
let p, d, s = get uf i in
if p = i then i
else
let r = find_opt uf p in
set uf i (r, d, s);
r
To prove the refinement of find to find_compress sound,
we prove a 4-ary relation showing that if running find and
find_compress on a heap h results in the heaps h1 and h2,
then the partition of a node j is the same in h1 and h2. This
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also implies that find_compress retains the canonical struc-
ture of the union-find forest.
val find_compress_refinement #n uf i h j
: Lemma (let (r1, h1), (r2, h2) =
reify (find uf i) h, reify (find_compress uf i) h in
r1 == r2 ∧ fst (reify (find uf j) h1) == fst (reify (find uf j) h2))
7 Related work
Much of the prior related work focused on checking specific
relational properties of programs, or general relational prop-
erties using special-purpose logics. In contrast, we argue
that proof assistants that support reasoning about pure and
effectful programs can, using our methodology, model and
verify relational properties in a generic way. The specific
incarnation of our methodology in F⋆ exploits its efficient
implementation of effects enabled by abstraction and con-
trolled reification; a unary weakest precondition calculus
as a base for relational proofs; SMT-based automation; and
the convenience of writing effectful code in direct style with
returns, binds, and lifts automatically inserted.
Static IFC tools Sabelfeld and Myers (2003a) survey a
number of IFC type systems and static analyses for show-
ing noninterference, trading completeness for automation.
More recent verification techniques for IFC aim for better
completeness (Amtoft and Banerjee 2004; Amtoft et al. 2012;
Banerjee et al. 2016; Barthe et al. 2014; Beringer and Hof-
mann 2007; Nanevski et al. 2013; Rabe 2016; Scheben and
Schmitt 2011), while compromising automation. The two
approaches can be combined, as discussed in in §5.2.
Relational program logics and type systems A variety
of program logics for reasoning about general relational prop-
erties have been proposed previously (Aguirre et al. 2017;
Barthe et al. 2009; Benton 2004; Yang 2007), while others
apply general relational logics to specific domains, including
access control (Nanevski et al. 2013), cryptography (Barthe
et al. 2009, 2012, 2013a; Petcher and Morrisett 2015), differ-
ential privacy (Barthe et al. 2013b; Zhang and Kifer 2017),
mechanism design (Barthe et al. 2015), cost analysis (Çiçek
et al. 2017), program approximations (Carbin et al. 2012).
RF⋆, is worth pointing out for its connection to F⋆. Barthe
et al.’s 2014 extend a prior, value-dependent version of F⋆
(Swamy et al. 2013) with a probabilistic semantics and a
type system that combines pRHL with refinement types.
Like many other relational Hoare logics, RF⋆ provided an
incomplete set of rules aimed at capturing many relational
properties by intrinsic typing only.
In this paper we instead provide a versatile generic method
for relational verification based on modeling effectful com-
putations using monads and proving relational properties
on their monadic representations, making the most of the
support for full dependent types and SMT-based automation
in the latest version of F⋆. This generic method can both be
used directly to verify programs or as a base for encoding
specialized relational program logics.
Product program constructions Product program con-
structions and self-composition are techniques aimed at re-
ducing the verification of k-safety properties (Clarkson and
Schneider 2010) to the verification of traditional (unary)
safety proprieties of a product program that emulates the
behavior of multiple input programs. Multiple such construc-
tions have been proposed (Barthe et al. 2016) targeted for
instance at secure IFC (Barthe et al. 2011; Naumann 2006; Ter-
auchi and Aiken 2005; Yasuoka and Terauchi 2014), program
equivalence for compiler validation (Zaks and Pnueli 2008),
equivalence checking and computing semantic differences
(Lahiri et al. 2012), program approximation (He et al. 2016).
Sousa and Dillig’s 2016 recent Descartes tool for k-safety
properties also creates k copies of the program, but uses
lockstep reasoning to improve performance by more tightly
coupling the key invariants across the program copies. Re-
cently Antonopoulos et al. (2017) propose a tool called Blazer
that obtains better scalability by using a new decomposition
of programs instead of using self-composition for k-safety
problems.
Other program equivalence techniques Beyond the ones
already mentioned above, many other techniques targeted
at program equivalence have been proposed; we briefly re-
view several recent works: Benton et al. (2009) do manual
proofs of correctness of compiler optimizations using par-
tial equivalence relations. Kundu et al. (2009) do automatic
translation validation of compiler optimizations by checking
equivalence of partially specified programs that can rep-
resent multiple concrete programs. Godlin and Strichman
(2010) propose proof rules for proving the equivalence of
recursive procedures. Lucanu and Rusu (2015) and Ştefan
Ciobâcă et al. (2016) generalize this to a set of co-inductive
equivalence proof rules that are language-independent. Auto-
matically checking the equivalence of processes in a process
calculus is an important building block for security protocol
analysis (Blanchet et al. 2008; Chadha et al. 2016).
Semantic techniques Many semantic techniques have
been proposed for reasoning about relational properties such
as observational equivalence, including techniques based on
binary logical relations (Ahmed et al. 2009; Benton et al.
2009, 2013, 2014; Dreyer et al. 2010, 2011, 2012; Mitchell
1986), bisimulations (Koutavas and Wand 2006; Sangiorgi
et al. 2011; Sumii 2009) and combinations thereof (Hur et al.
2012, 2014). While these very powerful techniques are often
not directly automated, they can be used to provide semantic
correctness proofs for relational program logics (Dreyer et al.
2010, 2011) and other verification tools (Benton et al. 2016).
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8 Future work
While we found F⋆ to be a versatile tool for relational veri-
fication of effectful programs, we also contemplated about
features that would make it even better suited.
Tactics F⋆’s current combination of SMT solving and
dependent typechecking with higher-order unification and
normalization provides good automation, but the ongoing
addition of tactics will provide more control and the possibil-
ity of user-defined decision procedures. In particular, when
using shallow embeddings (like we do in §3) tactics will allow
us to write meta-programs that automatically apply derived
proof rules based on the structure of the F⋆ program we
want to verify.
Extrinsic termination reasoning Aside from their use
in relational reasoning, extrinsic proofs of reified terms allow
programmers to defer proof obligations, rather than insisting
on proofs at the time of definition (while anticipating all
uses). While convenient, extrinsic proofs in F⋆ only apply to
programs that are intrinsically proved terminating. Building
on our use of McBride’s 2015 approach in §6.1, we aim to
define divergence as a reifiable effect, placing it on par with
other effects in F⋆. We could then reason about the partial
correctness of a program declared in this effect or to prove
its termination after its definition. Going back to the while
interpreter from §5.1, we could forget about the decreasing
metric and use either Bove and Capretta’s 2005 termination
witnesses or step-indexing as in §3.3 (Amin and Rompf 2017;
Owens et al. 2016), proving, for example, noninterference of
reachable states of an interactive non-terminating program.
Observational purity Another desirable feature would
be to hide the effect of a term if it is proven observationally
pure, e.g., in §6.1 this would provide the ability to replace the
original pure code by its equivalent memoized variant. Since
we are able to prove that the memoized code has the same
extensional behaviour as the pure code up to some private
data that we could abstract over, we would like to implement
a mechanism to encapsulate observationally pure code. We
hope that this mechanism could also be applied to programs
proven terminating extrinsically.
9 Conclusion
This paper advocates verifying relational properties of ef-
fectful programs using generic tools that are not specific to
relational reasoning: monadic effects, reification, dependent
types, non-relational weakest preconditions, and SMT-based
automation. Our experiments in F⋆ verifying relational prop-
erties about a variety of examples show thewide applicability
of this approach. One of the strong points is the great flexibil-
ity in modelling effects and expressing relational properties
about code using these effects. The other strong point is
the good balance between interactive control, SMT-based
automation, and the ability to encode even more automated
specialized tools where needed. Thanks to this, the effort
required from the F⋆ programmer for relational verification
seems on par with non-relational reasoning in F⋆ and with
specialized relational program logics.
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